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Highlights 
 Explore the effects of increased transparency, inflation targeting and forward guidance 
on aggregate uncertainty, common uncertainty and disagreement. 
 Provide evidence that increased transparency reduces mainly common uncertainty. 
 Looking at disagreement only understates benefits of transparency. 
Abstract 
Using survey data from 25 economies we provide evidence that greater transparency 
surrounding monetary policy reduces uncertainty of interest rates and inflation, primarily by 
reducing uncertainty that is common to agents rather than disagreement between agents.  This 
suggests that studies that focus on disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty understate the 
benefits of monetary policy transparency.  The adoption of inflation targets and forward 
guidance are both associated with lower uncertainty, although inflation targets have a stronger 
impact on reducing uncertainty than forward guidance.  Moreover, there are diminishing 
benefits from ever higher levels of transparency. Taken as a whole, our results support the 
contention that clarity of communication is as important as the magnitude of transparency.   
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1. Introduction  
Central banks argue that the effectiveness of the transmission channel increases if people 
have a sound understanding of monetary policy goals and strategies (see e.g. Bernanke, 
2007). One element to facilitate this understanding is central bank transparency. A number of 
studies find that greater transparency of policy decisions result in a common understanding 
among central bank watchers, which in turn brings with it reductions in forecast disagreement 
(e.g., Swanson, 2006; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2011; Neuenkirch, 2012; Montes et al., 2016; 
Trabelsi, 2016). The contention that more transparency also improves the efficiency of 
monetary policy making is supported by several studies (e.g. Blinder et al., 2008; Ehrmann et 
al. 2012) and explains the marked global trend for greater transparency in the framework and 
implementation of monetary policy (e.g., Geraats, 2009; Dincer and Eichengreen 2014). 
However, a counter view exists that increases in central bank transparency do not 
necessarily improve the understanding and efficacy of monetary policy. Morris and Shin 
(2002) show that public statements act as a focal point that can result in individuals placing 
too great a weight on public information and insufficient weight to private information.  This 
gives rise to the potential that private information is crowded out as individuals overreact to 
the public signal which implies that greater transparency may reduce disagreement, but not 
improve the accuracy of expectations.  Indeed, as Amato et al. (2002) highlight, “A central 
bank that relies on signals from the economy in its role as a vigilant observer of developments 
will find itself without a compass if the private information of the individual agents is 
prevented from finding an expression in their decisions” (Amato et al., 2002, p.497). 
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  Whether or not transparency can become detrimental is an empirical question; it is 
possible that increases in the volume and clarity of public information provided by central 
banks complement private information and this results in a reduction of disagreement and an 
overall improvement in the quality of forecasts.  Alternatively, if private information is 
crowded out by increased public information, disagreement may reduce but the average 
quality of forecasts deteriorates due to the loss of that private information.   
To test for the effects of transparency researchers typically look at expectations or 
disagreement (e.g.  Ehrmann et al., 2012 or Siklos, 2013). In contrast to Siklos (2013) we use 
a decomposition of forecast uncertainty due to Barron et al. (1998) and Lahiri and Sheng 
(2010) that enables us to test the crowding out hypothesis while distinguishing between the 
effect on disagreement with that on shared or common uncertainty. 
Using this decomposition, we can explore the effects of increased transparency separately 
on aggregate uncertainty, common uncertainty and disagreement. This approach enables us to 
assess whether the effect of transparency is relevant for all measures, whether it is 
homogeneous and whether it has similar effects on forecasts of policy variables (i.e., short- 
and long-term interest rates) and the primary policy target (inflation). To assess these 
questions empirically we use a wide range of countries and years and a variety of indicators to 
measure transparency (i.e. inflation targeting, forward guidance, and a transparency index). 
We show that transparency reduces both uncertainty and disagreement. In addition, we can 
make some relevant qualifications. Transparency has a stronger effect on uncertainty than on 
disagreement. Increases in central bank transparency benefits all economies up to an optimal 
level of transparency, but the benefits are greatest for economies that do not have an inflation 
target. Inflation targeting and transparency measured by an index affect the uncertainty and 
disagreement of all three expectation variables. Forward guidance affects uncertainty and 
disagreement of interest rates but only disagreement of inflation.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 reviews the 
literature. Section 3 presents the methodological framework and the data set. Section 4 reports 
the empirical findings as well as robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Most empirical studies that examine the effect of transparency on expectations and 
uncertainty
1
 use survey data to construct measures of the dispersion of individual forecasts 
around the average forecast, giving a measure of disagreement, or around the outcome, giving 
the mean forecast error as a proxy for uncertainty (e.g., Capistran and Timmerman, 2009; 
Siklos, 2013; Dovern, 2015).  The formal relationship between these two measures is 
explored in the context of forecasting accounting data in a series of papers by Barron et al. 
(1998) and further developed by Lahiri and Sheng (2010).  In this framework, the two 
measures can be seen as estimates of two additive components of total uncertainty which 
formally distinguishes between uncertainty that is common to all agents and uncertainty 
associated with disagreement.  
A problem with much of the empirical literature is the disconnect between the properties 
of the theoretical notion of uncertainty that is relevant to the literature with those of the 
empirical measure; the theoretical need is for an ex ante measure which captures probabilistic 
uncertainty at the time expectations are made but the commonly used mean forecast error is 
an ex post measure which can be highly skewed as a consequence of completely unforeseen 
events.  This problem is discussed by Ehrmann et al. (2012) who follow Capistran and 
Timmerman (2009) by using the conditional volatility of the variable that is forecasted as a 
                                                             
1 In what follows we use the term “uncertainty” as it is customarily used in this literature.  Strictly speaking, the 
literature on the effect of central bank communication is relating to the subjective probabilities of risk rather than 
the more elusive Knightian uncertainty.  
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control.  We address the problem more directly by following Lahiri and Sheng (2010) and 
using estimates of the conditional volatility as an estimate of ex ante uncertainty.  
The potential for public sources of information to crowd out private information is most 
closely associated with the work of Morris and Shin (2002).  The potential for public 
information to both convey fundamental information and act as a focal point for private 
beliefs, with the potential of the former crowding out the latter, was applied to monetary 
policy in Amato et al. (2002). 
A similar theoretical outcome is provided by Dale et al. (2011) who start from the 
premise that both central banks and private agents base their decisions and expectations on 
imperfect information and an imperfect understanding of the economy.  Additional 
information provided by the central bank can have a negative effect due to private agents 
being unable to properly evaluate the reliability of the information and consequently placing 
excessive weight on uncertain information.  Hence only the provision of certain information is 
unambiguously a good thing and the production of “noisy information” can result in bad 
decisions by the private sector.  To illustrate this they contrast the provision of a forecast, 
which they describe as uncertain or imperfect information, with that of an inflation target, 
which is more precise and less imperfect.  They demonstrate that the provision of a precise 
inflation target has a positive effect on the public’s ability to form expectations but this can be 
off-set by the simultaneous provision of imperfect forecasts which distracts from the more 
precise information. 
Dale et al. (2011) briefly consider other types of information.  For example, they suggest 
that informing the public of the outcome of a policy meeting comes under the category of 
“more precise” information whereas pronouncements about the future path of policy are more 
imperfect.  According to this, Odyssean forms of forward guidance will generally provide 
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clear and unambiguous advice whereas Delphic formats of forward guidance will generally be 
associated with less clear information which could be counter-productive.  Similarly, policy 
decisions made by a single decision maker are less noisy than decisions made by a committee 
working to majority decision making. 
Premised on the arguments for the potential for there to be too much information, van der 
Cruijsen et al. (2010) examine the relationship between transparency and inflation 
persistency.  They suggest an optimal level of transparency with inflation persistence 
declining but at a diminishing rate until the gains to further increases in transparency are 
outweighed by the costs due to information overload and the potential for too much 
transparency to exacerbate the complexity of monetary policy thereby creating uncertainty 
amongst agents external to the decision making (see also Demertzis and Hoeberichts 2007).  
As discussed by van der Cruijsen et al. (2010), the ideas underlying the notion of an optimal 
level of transparency relate to the type and quality of information. More recently, Neuenkirch 
(2013) examines the impact of central bank transparency on the forecast bias in 25 emerging 
money markets over the period of 1998 to 2009. His results reveal that all subcategories of the 
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) transparency index reduce the expectations bias and that there 
exists an optimal intermediate degree of transparency. 
A number of studies have provided evidence that has suggested the accuracy of interest 
rate forecasts has improved and the dispersion of forecasts has declined as a result of greater 
transparency of monetary policy (Swanson 2006; Berger et al. 2009; Bauer et al. 2006; 
Middeldorp 2011; Ehrmann et al. 2012; Lahiri and Sheng 2010).  Similar results have been 
found for inflation forecasts (Swanson 2006; Crowe 2010; Crowe and Meade 2008; Ehrmann 
et al. 2012).  These results have, however, been questioned.  For example, Howells and 
Mariscal (2008) argue that the decline in dispersion of interest rate forecasts has been due to 
the reduction in uncertainty of the macro environment. Of more direct relevance to the 
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hypotheses examined in this paper, Kool and Thornton (2015) show that forward guidance 
has been associated with: i) reduced dispersion of forecasts of interest rates in New Zealand, 
Norway and Sweden but not in the USA; and ii) limited evidence for improved accuracy of 
forecasts of short term interest rates but no improvement for forecasts of long rates.  
Similarly, for inflation forecasts Siklos (2013) reports evidence which shows that greater 
central bank transparency tends to increase disagreement.  
 
3. Methodological framework and data 
Our framework is in the spirit of Barron et al. (1998) and follows that of Davies and Lahiri 
(1995), Lahiri and Sheng (2010) and Ozturk and Sheng (forthcoming) who decompose 
forecast errors into common and idiosyncratic components.  Given a forecast, ithF , made by 
agent i  over horizon h  for target year t , the forecast error is defined as  
                  (1) 
where     is the actual outcome for the variable of interest.  The forecast error can be 
decomposed into two components: errors due to shocks that are common to all forecasters, 
th , and individual or idiosyncratic errors, ith , due to agents having access to different 
information sets and models or alternative interpretations of the same information 
iththithe         (2)  
The common component, th , is in turn the sum of common shocks during the forecast 
horizon,     
        
 
   
 
      (3) 
  
8 
 
The decomposition of uncertainty,    , into common and idiosyncratic components is 
presented in equation (4).   
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We consider two approaches to estimate the common component, 
2
th
  in equation (4).  
One, an ex post measure of uncertainty based on Barron et al. (1998) estimates the common 
component, 
2
th
 , as the squared error of the mean forecast  
  ththtth dFAU 
2
    (6) 
The observed deviations of individual forecasts around the mean are generally regarded 
to be a reasonable measure of uncertainty associated with different information sets and 
interpretation of that information.  The Morris and Shin proposal that there can be too much 
transparency would mean that increased transparency gives rise to a reduction in dispersion,
thd , but not the mean forecast error,  
2
tht FA  . 
Using the observed deviations of average forecasts around the outcome in equation (6) as 
a measure of common uncertainty is problematic from both a conceptual and practical 
perspective.  As an ex post measure of variability it is subject to sharp variations due to 
realized extreme events, which may or may not have been anticipated, which distort it as a 
temporal measure of uncertainty.  This gives rise to the second approach which follows that of 
Lahiri and Sheng (2010) and uses an estimate of the common component obtained from a 
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GARCH model and represented as 
2ˆ
th
  also in conjunction with the dispersion of forecasts, 
thd  
ththth
dU  2ˆˆ

      (7) 
Our primary objective is to test whether increases in central bank communication is 
always a good thing.  Models developed by Morris and Shin (2002), Dale et al. (2011) and 
Kool et al. (2011) give rise to what we can describe as the crowding out hypothesis which 
suggests that improved communications, be it through forward guidance, inflation targeting or 
simply more transparent communication as reflected in an improved transparency score, will 
result in a reduction in dispersion but not necessarily a decline in the uncertainty or accuracy 
of forecasts.  The decomposition presented in equation (7) enables us to test this hypothesis 
by estimating the effect of measures or indicators of central bank transparency on total 
uncertainty and its component parts, disagreement and common uncertainty.  
The widely held view that more transparency is a good thing is represented by hypothesis 
H1A while the alternative crowding out argument due to Morris and Shin and others is 
represented by H1B.  A milder version in which there is no significant effect on common 
uncertainty is provided by H1C. 
H1A: Increases in central bank communication reduce both disagreement and common 
uncertainty  
H1B: Increases in central bank communication reduce disagreement but increases common 
uncertainty  
H1C: Increases in central bank communication reduce disagreement but have no effect on 
common uncertainty  
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A more nuanced variation of the above hypotheses is due to van der Cruijsen et al. (2010) 
and others who suggest there are limits to benefits from increased communication.  A mild 
version of the hypothesis that arises from this is that the benefits of increases in 
communication diminish at higher levels of transparency while a stronger version is that the 
benefits are eventually exceeded by the costs of transparency, giving us hypotheses H2A and 
H2B respectively.   
H2A: Increases in central bank communication reduce disagreement and common uncertainty, 
but at a diminishing rate 
H2B: Increases in central bank communication reduce disagreement and common uncertainty, 
but at a diminishing rate such that there is an optimal level of transparency  
We use forecast data of interest rates and CPI inflation from Consensus Economics 
covering the G7, Europe (October 1989 to end 2013) as well as Asia Pacific (January 1995 to 
end 2013).  This database is well known and used in earlier studies (e.g. Chortareas et al., 
2012; Jitmaneeroj and Wood, 2013; Siklos 2013; Bauer and Neuenkirch, 2017). Notably 
previous research focused mainly on the G7 countries often ignoring the Asian Pacific sample 
or vice versa. Using the two databases we are able to consider the effects of central bank 
communication on up to 25 economies. While forecasters are asked to provide interest rate 
forecasts at 3- and 12-month horizons, they forecast CPI inflation for current and next years. 
To capture resulting seasonality effects, we include monthly dummy variable in our empirical 
models.
2
 
We use both binary indicators and an index to signify differences in transparency.  
Inflation targeting has been identified as a clear and unambiguous signal to agents about the 
central bank’s inflation objective.  The dummy variable, IT, takes the value of 1 during the 
                                                             
2 Adding dummy variables is a standard way to address seasonality. For a more advanced procedure see Knüppel 
and Vlaadu (2016). 
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inflation targeting period in each economy and zero otherwise (see Table 1).
3
 Forward 
guidance is an additional tool that increases transparency and consequently according to H1A 
we would expect a lower dispersion and uncertainty in countries with forward guidance. 
Moreover, given that one of the primary motivations for adopting forward guidance is to 
increase the effectiveness of monetary policy when short term rates are already at the lower 
bound (Dincer and Eichengreen 2014) we are particularly interested in the effect of forward 
guidance on long term rates and longer horizon forecasts.  We use the dummy variable, FG, 
which takes the value of 1 during the forward guidance period in each country and zero 
otherwise.
4
 However, we are conscious that a binary indicator is problematic given that 
forward guidance has been applied very differently across the central banks in terms of 
content and guidance.  Furthermore, even within individual central banks there have been 
substantial revisions in terms of the style and content of the delivery of forward guidance. 
Consequently, given these observations it is unclear whether we should observe a strong 
relationship between our crude binary measure of forward guidance and disagreement and 
uncertainty.   
[Table 1: The adoption of inflation targeting and forward guidance] 
In addition to the IT and FG dummy variables, we use the index of transparency 
constructed by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014).  This index is constructed by the summation 
of indicators relating to political, economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency 
and can lie between 0 and 15.  In practice, the lowest transparency score for our sample is 1 
for China during the years 1998 to 2001, and the highest score is 15 for Sweden from 2002 
through to the end of the sample period.  The trend for greater central bank transparency 
                                                             
3
 The date of inflation targeting adoption in each country is derived from Cecchetti and Hakkio (2010) and 
Hammond (2012). As pointed out by Little and Romano (2008), monetary policy for the Eurozone, Japan, and 
Switzerland can be regarded as inflation targeting although they pursue other policy goals in addition to the price 
stability objective. This study therefore considers the Eurozone, Japan and Switzerland as inflation targeters. 
4 The date of forward guidance adoption in each country is obtained from Campbell et al., (2012), Kool and 
Thornton (2015), Detmers and Nautz (2012) and Svensson (2015).  
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identified by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) can be seen in the graphs presented in Figure 1, 
not just with the upward trend for average transparency but also the increasing proportion of 
central banks adopting inflation targeting and/or forward guidance.  
 [Figure 1: Increasing central bank communication] 
The mean and median values of the two components of aggregate uncertainty for each of 
the variables of interest are presented in Table 2.  Some consistent patterns are evident. First, 
the mean is larger than the corresponding median in almost all cases, often substantially so.  
Second, a comparison of short and long horizons shows the latter to be significantly larger 
than the former for both the measure of common uncertainty and disagreement.  The 
difference between short and long horizons is much larger for common uncertainty than 
disagreement. Third, the importance of common uncertainty to aggregate uncertainty 
increases in both absolute and relative terms as we move from short to long horizons.  Median 
values of disagreement tend to be comparable in magnitude to the corresponding value of 
common uncertainty at the short horizon whereas the importance of common uncertainty 
relative to disagreement increases over the long horizon.  
[Table 2: Mean comparison test between short and long forecast horizons] 
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 The effect of the monetary policy regime – binary distinctions 
To test for the effect of adopting either an inflation target or forward guidance on components 
of uncertainty we estimate the regression presented in equation (8) with binary indicators for 
whether the central bank adopted an inflation target, IT, or forward guidance, FG, as our main 
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points of focus.  The regressions are estimated with country and annual fixed effects in 
addition to macro control variables, itM .  
               
    
             
  
                             (8) 
where      is the uncertainty component (i.e., aggregate uncertainty, common uncertainty or 
disagreement) of country i at month t,     is a yearly dummy variable to capture time varying 
uncertainty,     is a monthly dummy variable to capture seasonality in forecasts,      is an 
inflation targeting dummy variable that takes a value of 1 during inflation targeting periods 
and zero otherwise,      is a forward guidance dummy variable that takes a value of 1 during 
the forward guidance periods and zero otherwise, itM  is a set of economic control variables,  
    is the error term,   ,   ,    , and     are parameters, and   is a coefficient vector 
associated with control variables. We include a number of control variables that have been 
identified in the literature as having potential impact on forecast uncertainty and disagreement 
(e.g., Dopke and Fritsche, 2006; van der Cruijsen and Demertzis, 2007; Patton and 
Timmermann, 2010; Dovern et al., 2012; Ehrmann et al., 2012; Lamla and Maag, 2012; 
Hartmann and Roestel, 2013; Posso and Tawadros, 2013; Siklos, 2013). Accordingly, our 
control variables are the lagged 1-month changes in dollar exchange rates, the change in WTI 
crude oil price, and unemployment rate, in addition to the output gap, the term spread defined 
as the difference between a 10-year government bond yield and a 3-month money market rate 
and the corresponding level variable for inflation, short-term or long-term rate.
5
 We use 
standard errors that are robust to suspected heteroscedasticity and within panel 
autocorrelation. 
                                                             
5 All data is from Datastream Professional.  The output gap is estimated by Oxford Economics in the form: 
100×(ln(real GDP) - ln(potential output)). Please note furthermore, that we estimated different specifications of 
our model where we added additional control variables to the M vector. For instance we accounted for economic 
policy uncertainty (Baker et al., 2016) and controlled for potential business cycle effects by adding and 
interacting recession period dummy variables. Results remain qualitatively identical and are available on request. 
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The results reported in Table 3 show that IT is associated with significantly lower 
measures of both common uncertainty and disagreement for each of the three variables for 
both short and long horizons, in support of H1A.  Although with one exception the IT 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level, the size of the IT effect is relatively modest for 
disagreement when compared to the corresponding effect for common uncertainty.  This 
indicates that the beneficial effects of IT in reducing aggregate uncertainty are primarily due 
to the reduction of common uncertainty and less to the reduction of disagreement. 
[Table 3: The influence of inflation targeting and forward guidance on uncertainty 
components] 
Forward guidance is associated with reductions in both disagreement and common 
uncertainty for long and short term interest rates, with the reductions in disagreement being 
similar in magnitude to the corresponding reduction associated with IT.  By contrast, forward 
guidance is associated with reductions in disagreement over CPI but increases, albeit 
insignificant, in common uncertainty for CPI. As with inflation targeting, the effect of 
forward guidance on common uncertainty is much larger than on disagreement. When 
interpreting these results, it should be noted that, with the exception of the US, countries that 
adopt forward guidance already have inflation targets (Table 1), implying that for those 
countries a forward guidance effect is additional to the effect of inflation targeting.   
The results reported in Table 3 are consistent with forward guidance providing agents 
with greater clarity about the policy makers’ intentions regarding policy instruments, resulting 
in reductions in both common uncertainty and disagreement for policy targets of both short 
and long term interest rates, in support of H1A.  But the effect of forward guidance on the 
policy objective of inflation is limited to reducing disagreement without reducing the 
systematic component of uncertainty relating to inflation, consistent with H1C. 
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Notably, those results are not only statistically significant but also economically 
meaningful. For this purpose we compare the influence of all explanatory variables on the 
dependent variable in terms of a one standard deviation shock. Out of eight explanatory 
variables for aggregate uncertainty over the short term, IT ranks third for CPI, fifth for STR 
and first for LTR. For aggregate uncertainty over the longer horizon, IT ranks fifth for 
CPI, second for STR and fifth for LTR. For the results reported in Table 4, the effect of the 
economic relevance of the transparency index is ranked either first or second in every 
estimation. 
4.2 The nonlinear effect of monetary policy transparency 
The relationship between uncertainty components and Dincer and Eichengreen’s measure of 
the transparency of monetary policy, TR, is estimated using equation 9 and reported in table 
4.  There are a number of reasons why the relationship might not be linear.  According to Dale 
et al. (2011) the production of “noisy information” can result in bad decisions by the private 
sector.  From this perspective, some of the metrics which constitute the Dincer-Eichengreen 
transparency index are likely to be unambiguous in their interpretation and therefore have a 
positive effect on expectations, for example a clear policy objective such as an inflation 
target, while others may be seen as more noisy and open to interpretation, such as forecasts 
and the publication of minutes of committee meetings.  Non-linear effects will be likely if 
marginal increases in the transparency index scores are achieved by the adoption of ever less 
reliable or more ambiguous communication mechanisms. We therefore include a squared 
term, TR
2
, to allow for non-linear relationships and we consider possible turning points.
6
   
               
    
             
  
                    
               (9) 
[Table 4: The influence of monetary policy transparency on uncertainty components] 
                                                             
6 In unreported results, cubed terms were included but they only provided a slight twist to the relationship 
without fundamentally changing it and with little effect on the fit.   
  
16 
 
The results for common uncertainty and disagreement share similar features, each with 
significant negative coefficients for TR and positive coefficients for TR
2
 giving rise to non-
linear transparency effects, declining to a minimum of between 8.4 and 12.2.  This should be 
seen in the context of the TR index ranging from 1 to 15 with a median score of 9.5, thereby 
supporting hypothesis H2B. The negative relationship between transparency and 
disagreement is in line with Ehrmann et al. (2012) but in contrast to the results presented in 
Siklos (2013) who find that central bank transparency tends to increase forecast disagreement 
in most economies, with the exception of the Eurozone and the US. 
Where the results differ is in the size of the effects.  The effect of transparency on 
common uncertainty is much larger than on disagreement, especially for STR and LTR.  This 
pattern of results is similar to that which is seen with the results from the regressions reported 
in Table 3, although the difference between the effect of transparency on common uncertainty 
relative to disagreement is more pronounced than is the corresponding difference due to the 
binary effects of IT and FG reported in Table 3, especially with the results for both short and 
long term interest rates.   
4.3 The effect of monetary policy transparency: inflation targeting versus non-inflation 
targeting   
Developing the argument of Dale et al. (2011), a clear and precise inflation target should  
unambiguously improve the quality of forecasts, whereas once inflation targeting is stripped 
out of the Dincer-Eichengreen transparency index many of the remaining components can be 
considered in the category of “noisy” information which may have a negative effect on 
uncertainty which can potentially counter the benefits of a clear inflation target.  This gives 
rise to the possibility of greater transparency as measured by the Dincer-Eichengreen index 
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being more beneficial for countries that do not have an inflation target than for countries that 
do.   
The results for non-IT countries are reported in panels A1 and B1 of Table 5 while those 
for IT countries are reported in panels A2 and B2.  Focusing first on non-IT countries, with 
the exception of common uncertainty surrounding long horizon CPI forecasts, the results are 
broadly consistent with those in Table 4 with transparency having a negative effect on both 
common uncertainty and disagreement, but this negative effect decreases before bottoming 
out for transparency scores of between 8.9 and 10.6.  These turning points tend to be slightly 
lower than those reported in Table 4, although the non-IT sample does tend to have lower 
transparency scores than the IT sample, with a median score of 8.5 for non-IT countries 
compared to 10 for IT countries.   
[Table 5: The influence of monetary policy transparency on uncertainty components for 
inflation and non-inflation targeting] 
The results for IT countries are more complex.  For the policy instruments, STR and 
LTR, the effects of greater transparency are broadly beneficial for common uncertainty but 
not for disagreement.  In detail, greater transparency reduces common uncertainty at a 
diminishing rate for both STR and LTR over the long horizon, and for LTR over the short 
horizon, but the effect is insignificant for short horizon STR. The effect of increased 
transparency on disagreement over STR and LTR is insignificant, with the exception of the 
short horizon for LTR for which increases in transparency are associated with an increase in 
disagreement.  Turning to the results for CPI, transparency has no significant effect on 
disagreement surrounding either short or long horizon forecasts of CPI but it has a non-linear 
positive effect on the common uncertainty surrounding short horizon CPI forecasts and has no 
significant effect on the common uncertainty of long horizon CPI forecasts. 
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Putting the results for CPI as reported in Table 5 alongside those reported in Table 3, it 
can be seen that while the adoption of inflation targeting has a clear beneficial effect in 
reducing both common uncertainty and disagreement of inflation forecasts, additional 
increases in transparency over and above the adoption of IT either has no significant effect or, 
in the case of near term common uncertainty, can potentially undermine the positive effects of 
IT.   
4.4 Robustness Analysis  
4.4.1 Propensity Score Matching and Ex-Post Measure of Uncertainty 
To address any biases resulting from the likelihood that the sample of economies with central 
banks that have adopted IT are likely to differ from those that have not, we use propensity 
score matching (see also Crowe 2010). Propensity score matching allows making two sub 
samples more similar by weighting the data appropriately. For this purpose, we match the first 
and second moments of our forecast variables CPI, STR and LTR.  
We also repeat the regressions reported above using the more conventional ex post measure of 
uncertainty obtained from the deviation of forecasts from outcome.  As argued above, 
although this measure is commonly used in the literature, the fact that it is an ex post measure 
renders it inappropriate as a measure of uncertainty. 
The coefficients of interest from equation 8 are reported in table 6.  The ex ante results 
correspond to those reported in Table 3, are presented alongside the corresponding 
coefficients using the ex post measure of common uncertainty and those for both common 
uncertainty and disagreement using propensity score matching (PSM). With one exception, 
the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3, with the same results for tests 
of significance and, for those coefficients that are significant, the same signs.  The exception 
is the effect of FG on long horizon LTR which is significant at the 10% level for ex ante and 
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PSM, but insignificant for the ex post measure. For the most part, the economic significance 
of the results is also similar.  The exception being the ex post results for the effect of forward 
guidance on STR uncertainty, with a smaller effect for the short horizon and a larger effect for 
the long horizon.   
 [Table 6: Alternative estimates of dummy variable effects] 
The results for the effect of transparency on our ex post measures of common uncertainty are 
reported in Table 7 alongside the corresponding results for ex ante common uncertainty from 
Table 4.  Again, the results are qualitatively similar.  The optimal turning point at which the 
reduction in uncertainty peaks is very similar irrespective of how uncertainty is calculated.  
There is some variation in the magnitude of the impact of transparency, but the overall 
narrative remains unchanged.   
[Table 7: Comparison of ex ante and ex post results for common uncertainty] 
4.4.2 Emerging vs Developed Economies 
  As there might be a difference between the effect of IT and Transparency on the uncertainty 
measures in developed and emerging countries we split the sample according to the developed 
countries definition of the International Monetary Fund and report the results in Tables 8 and 
9.
7
 First of all we would like to highlight that the general result of a differential effect of 
common uncertainty and disagreement holds for both sub-samples. That said we can further 
qualify our results by noting that over the short horizon, IT and transparency is more 
important for emerging countries than for developed countries in reducing aggregate 
uncertainty, common uncertainty and disagreement. This could be explained by the 
nonlinearity of transparency we have documented earlier. At lower levels the effect is much 
stronger. By contrast, over the long horizon the benefit of the adoption of IT by the central 
                                                             
7 Please note that we need to drop FG from these results since forward guidance has only been adopted by 
developed economies.   
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bank of an emerging economy is restricted to reducing common uncertainty and disagreement 
over STR and not LTR or CPI.  Increases in transparency has no significant effects for any 
long horizon uncertainty measures for emerging economies.   
[Table 8: The influence of inflation targeting on uncertainty components for emerging and 
developed economies] 
[Table 9: The influence of monetary policy transparency on uncertainty components for 
emerging and developed economies] 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the consequence of central banks providing more information via 
increased transparency, inflation targeting and forward guidance. Several papers deliver 
empirical evidence demonstrating that advances in communication and increased transparency 
by central banks reduce disagreement. However, disagreement is only one element worth 
looking at. Following the decomposition of Barron et al. (1998) and Lahiri and Sheng (2010) 
we look at aggregate uncertainty, common uncertainty and disagreement jointly. This enables 
us to test the crowding out hypothesis due to Morris and Shin (2002) and others.  
Using survey data from 25 economies, covering not only the standard Western countries 
but the Asian countries as well, we provide evidence that IT, FG and transparency 
significantly affect uncertainty and disagreement of expectation of inflation as well as 
expectations of short- and long-term interest rates. Notably the effects of IT, FG and 
transparency are quite different. While in most cases IT and transparency significantly 
reduces uncertainty according to all measures used, the effect on aggregate uncertainty is 
mainly due to the impact on common uncertainty and less on disagreement.  This implies that 
previous studies that have focused on the impact of transparency on disagreement tend to 
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underestimate the benefits of monetary policy transparency in managing market expectations, 
especially if disagreement is used as a proxy for uncertainty 
Furthermore, the effects are of course different across our measures of transparency: IT, 
FG and the transparency index. In summary, the most effective measure for achieving a 
reduction of uncertainty is the adoption of IT.  Forward guidance has additional benefits for 
expectations of interest rates but has less clear benefits for uncertainty surrounding inflation.  
Increases in central bank transparency benefits all economies up to an optimal level of 
transparency, but the benefits are greatest for economies that do not have an inflation target.  
In terms of both disagreement and common uncertainty, the most beneficial combination is to 
adopt IT in addition to FG and to have a high, but not too high, level of central bank 
transparency.    
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Figure 1: Increasing central bank communication 
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Notes: This figure plots the time evolution of central bank communication as measured by the percentage of inflation 
targeting, the percentage of forward guidance, and the average of transparency index across all countries over the period 
of October 1989 to December 2013. The transparency index of Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) is not available prior to 
1998. 
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Table 1: The adoptions of inflation targeting and forward guidance 
 Country 
The adoption of 
inflation targeting 
The adoption of 
forward guidance 
Transparency index: 
mean 
Transparency index: 
standard deviation 
Australia Jun-93 n/a 9.50 1.26 
Canada Feb-91 Apr-09 10.81 0.25 
China n/a n/a 2.53 1.02 
Eurozone Jan-99 Jul-13 10.41 0.99 
France Jan-99 n/a 10.41 0.99 
Germany Jan-99 n/a 10.41 0.99 
Hong Kong (Quarterly) n/a n/a 6.94 0.77 
India n/a n/a 2.50 0.52 
Indonesia Jul-05 n/a 7.13 2.13 
Italy Jan-99 n/a 10.41 0.99 
Japan Mar-06 Apr-99 9.34 1.19 
Malaysia n/a n/a 5.81 0.51 
Netherlands Jan-99 n/a 10.41 0.99 
New Zealand Mar-90 Jun-97 13.63 0.90 
Norway Mar-01 Mar-05 9.03 1.68 
Philippines Jan-02 n/a 8.53 2.26 
Singapore n/a n/a 4.75 1.00 
South Korea Apr-98 n/a 8.47 0.90 
Spain Nov-94 n/a 10.41 0.99 
Sweden Jan-93 Feb-07 13.94 2.02 
Switzerland Jan-00 n/a 9.09 1.40 
Taiwan n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Thailand May-00 n/a 7.50 2.41 
United Kingdom Oct-92 Aug-13 12.22 0.41 
United States n/a Aug-03 10.53 0.88 
 
Notes: The date of inflation targeting adoption in each country is derived from Cecchetti and Hakkio (2010) and 
Hammond (2012).  Spain terminated the inflation targeting in December 1998. As pointed out by Little and Romano 
(2008), monetary policy of Eurozone, Japan, and Switzerland can be regarded as inflation targeting although they 
pursue other policy goals in addition to the price stability objective. The date of forward guidance adoption in each 
country is obtained from Campbell et al. (2012), Detmers and Nautz (2012), Cool and Thornton (2015), and 
Svensson (2015). United States terminated forward guidance in December 2005 and readopted in December 2008. 
For France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain, the adoption of inflation targeting and forward guidance from 
1999 follows Eurozone. The transparency indices over the period of 1998 to 2013 are derived from Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2014). 
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Table 2: Mean and median comparison between short and long forecast horizons  
 
Country Obs. Common uncertainty Disagreement 
  Short horizon Long horizon Short horizon Long horizon 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel  A: Consumer price inflation (CPI) 
Australia 278 0.297 0.038 2.433 0.802 0.083 0.051 0.221 0.120 
Canada 291 0.113 0.032 1.132 0.175 0.048 0.037 0.124 0.114 
China 229 2.011 0.368 15.695 4.137 0.575 0.251 1.395 0.738 
Eurozone 133 0.115 0.019 1.334 0.305 0.017 0.016 0.048 0.039 
France 291 0.074 0.014 0.599 0.310 0.031 0.023 0.062 0.053 
Germany 291 0.201 0.049 0.868 0.245 0.051 0.030 0.194 0.159 
Hong Kong 229 0.746 0.105 8.788 2.789 0.308 0.170 0.765 0.514 
India 229 4.467 0.994 10.576 4.377 0.856 0.585 1.026 0.888 
Indonesia 204 8.418 0.440 151.646 5.745 8.690 0.479 8.219 0.903 
Italy 291 0.093 0.017 0.850 0.444 0.035 0.020 0.110 0.062 
Japan 291 0.086 0.023 0.543 0.242 0.060 0.042 0.139 0.104 
Malaysia 229 0.739 0.103 2.560 0.813 0.313 0.090 0.667 0.224 
Netherlands 228 0.048 0.025 0.632 0.188 0.045 0.029 0.120 0.097 
New Zealand 229 0.213 0.042 1.219 0.502 0.127 0.074 0.183 0.140 
Norway 187 0.113 0.028 0.750 0.433 0.072 0.049 0.116 0.087 
Philippines 57 0.368 0.111 0.567 0.430 0.212 0.128 0.408 0.319 
Singapore 229 1.396 0.183 6.114 1.346 0.167 0.086 0.272 0.179 
South Korea 229 0.423 0.047 2.675 0.681 0.252 0.080 0.470 0.190 
Spain 228 0.147 0.039 1.462 0.561 0.048 0.028 0.124 0.082 
Sweden 228 0.234 0.056 1.826 1.231 0.060 0.038 0.133 0.107 
Switzerland 187 0.061 0.017 0.810 0.300 0.050 0.039 0.121 0.085 
Taiwan 229 0.633 0.205 2.489 1.061 0.140 0.101 0.263 0.196 
Thailand 229 0.729 0.103 5.938 1.245 0.456 0.164 1.052 0.335 
United Kingdom  291 0.935 0.675 1.563 1.098 0.117 0.037 0.319 0.183 
United States 291 0.123 0.021 1.000 0.353 0.054 0.032 0.202 0.164 
Panel B: Short term interest rates (STR) 
Australia 278 0.505 0.077 4.148 1.385 0.047 0.031 0.256 0.137 
Canada 244 0.595 0.063 2.885 0.941 0.065 0.042 0.236 0.194 
China n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Eurozone n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
France 291 0.578 0.076 2.255 0.918 0.059 0.033 0.155 0.120 
Germany 291 0.179 0.050 1.693 0.848 0.045 0.033 0.197 0.168 
Hong Kong 229 1.460 0.097 4.033 1.105 0.131 0.059 0.260 0.201 
India 229 2.431 0.406 6.896 1.944 0.375 0.186 0.682 0.410 
Indonesia 226 44.328 2.013 142.651 7.441 4.406 0.612 5.747 1.168 
Italy 291 0.925 0.098 3.714 1.235 0.078 0.033 0.175 0.116 
Japan 291 0.145 0.007 1.178 0.096 0.019 0.011 0.067 0.043 
Malaysia 229 0.637 0.018 2.842 0.213 0.085 0.031 0.289 0.088 
Netherlands 228 0.231 0.050 1.870 0.736 0.033 0.023 0.121 0.101 
New Zealand 229 0.693 0.115 3.197 1.429 0.084 0.039 0.257 0.170 
Norway 187 0.643 0.051 3.489 0.965 0.068 0.034 0.167 0.140 
Philippines 27 2.755 12.902 8.927 18.348 0.367 0.181 0.237 0.061 
Singapore 229 1.384 0.040 1.824 0.668 0.119 0.035 0.213 0.118 
South Korea 229 4.983 0.099 8.584 0.884 0.506 0.072 0.556 0.260 
Spain 228 0.202 0.066 2.476 1.073 0.036 0.025 0.120 0.088 
Sweden 228 0.288 0.077 3.935 0.989 0.049 0.036 0.163 0.123 
Switzerland 187 0.453 0.018 1.582 0.487 0.027 0.017 0.105 0.084 
Taiwan 227 0.602 0.100 2.018 0.412 0.119 0.059 0.211 0.137 
Thailand 229 6.942 0.168 19.887 2.065 0.808 0.094 1.121 0.267 
United Kingdom  291 0.396 0.060 2.520 0.843 0.071 0.048 0.325 0.225 
United States 291 0.427 0.046 3.983 1.179 0.047 0.037 0.202 0.175 
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Table 2: Mean and median comparison between short and long forecast horizons (continued) 
 
Country Obs. Common uncertainty Disagreement 
   Short horizon Long horizon Short horizon Long horizon 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel C: Long term interest rates (LTR) 
Australia 278 0.467 0.265 1.639 0.871 0.078 0.064 0.206 0.165 
Canada 291 0.326 0.181 0.801 0.803 0.086 0.066 0.199 0.166 
China 126 0.075 0.020 0.826 0.168 0.033 0.020 0.119 0.083 
Eurozone n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
France 291 0.291 0.143 0.849 0.777 0.059 0.044 0.127 0.109 
Germany 291 0.270 0.155 0.839 0.830 0.066 0.056 0.180 0.169 
Hong Kong 229 0.335 0.009 2.030 0.293 0.061 0.026 0.159 0.125 
India 229 5.550 1.331 4.450 3.172 0.224 0.137 0.501 0.280 
Indonesia 131 4.108 0.974 7.953 5.099 0.621 0.327 1.184 0.861 
Italy 291 0.554 0.147 2.707 0.680 0.120 0.065 0.191 0.127 
Japan 291 0.297 0.059 0.600 0.310 0.039 0.028 0.100 0.080 
Malaysia 229 0.300 0.010 1.351 0.098 0.129 0.029 0.300 0.079 
Netherlands 228 0.211 0.131 0.631 0.777 0.052 0.039 0.132 0.110 
New Zealand 229 0.406 0.182 0.798 0.348 0.096 0.070 0.167 0.124 
Norway 187 0.252 0.145 0.917 0.759 0.066 0.040 0.131 0.102 
Philippines n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Singapore 222 0.095 0.004 0.253 0.022 0.060 0.026 0.111 0.066 
South Korea 162 0.489 0.182 1.367 0.605 0.134 0.080 0.313 0.240 
Spain 228 0.312 0.153 2.096 0.734 0.103 0.058 0.177 0.131 
Sweden 228 0.316 0.183 2.034 0.833 0.069 0.053 0.156 0.128 
Switzerland 187 0.153 0.080 0.505 0.554 0.039 0.030 0.080 0.068 
Taiwan 94 0.082 0.027 0.333 0.156 0.037 0.022 0.098 0.063 
Thailand 229 4.432 1.027 5.896 2.010 0.166 0.079 0.506 0.197 
United Kingdom  291 0.414 0.179 0.827 0.408 0.084 0.062 0.206 0.177 
United States 291 0.343 0.191 0.798 0.848 0.068 0.059 0.186 0.172 
 
Notes: This table reports the mean and median measures of common uncertainty and disagreement. Following Lahiri 
and Sheng (2010), aggregate uncertainty equals the combination of common uncertainty and disagreement as shown in 
equation (7). 
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Table 3: The influence of inflation targeting and forward guidance on uncertainty components  
 
Component Variable                                                   
  
Panel A: Short horizon 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -0.567*** -0.041 0.216** 0.004 5.496*** -0.038*** 0.092* 0.166*** 12.15% 
 (0.065) (0.068) (0.108) (0.015) (0.440) (0.009) (0.053) (0.013)  
 STR  -0.898*** -0.762*** 0.357 -0.885*** 33.741*** -0.489*** 0.895*** 0.669*** 25.25% 
  (0.301) (0.283) (0.428) (0.078) (1.709) (0.034) (0.209) (0.048)  
 LTR  -1.018*** -0.278** 0.578*** -0.212*** 7.216*** -0.167*** 0.494*** 0.147*** 9.95% 
  (0.137) (0.129) (0.192) (0.027) (0.775) (0.015) (0.095) (0.022)  
Common uncertainty CPI  -0.532*** 0.016 0.174* 0.061*** 2.400*** -0.013 0.089* 0.143*** 8.53% 
 (0.058) (0.061) (0.097) (0.013) (0.394) (0.008) (0.048) (0.011)  
 STR  -0.743*** -0.672** 0.336 -0.825*** 30.867*** -0.445*** 0.938*** 0.625*** 24.34% 
  (0.286) (0.269) (0.406) (0.074) (1.622) (0.032) (0.198) (0.046)  
 LTR  -0.988*** -0.247** 0.509*** -0.202*** 6.445*** -0.157*** 0.461*** 0.124*** 9.29% 
  (0.133) (0.126) (0.187) (0.026) (0.755) (0.015) (0.092) (0.021)  
Disagreement CPI  -0.035* -0.056*** 0.042 -0.056*** 3.096*** -0.025*** 0.004 0.023*** 16.93% 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.034) (0.005) (0.137) (0.003) (0.017) (0.004)  
 STR  -0.155*** -0.089*** 0.021 -0.060*** 2.874*** -0.044*** -0.043** 0.044*** 20.85% 
  (0.026) (0.024) (0.037) (0.007) (0.146) (0.003) (0.018) (0.004)  
 LTR  -0.030** -0.032*** 0.069*** -0.010*** 0.771*** -0.010*** 0.033*** 0.023*** 7.31% 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.002) (0.069) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002)  
Panel B: Long horizon 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -1.335*** 0.223 2.861*** -0.715*** 16.403*** -0.334*** 0.991*** 0.675*** 8.42% 
 (0.306) (0.320) (0.510) (0.070) (2.077) (0.042) (0.251) (0.060)  
 STR  -5.398*** -0.609 1.643 -0.035 22.985*** 0.284*** 0.969* 1.326*** 12.69% 
  (0.755) (0.711) (1.074) (0.195) (4.286) (0.084) (0.524) (0.120)  
 LTR  -1.132*** -0.427** -1.261*** -0.811*** 20.575*** -0.433*** 0.054 0.602*** 19.89% 
  (0.229) (0.215) (0.322) (0.045) (1.296) (0.026) (0.158) (0.036)  
Common uncertainty CPI  -1.231*** 0.378 2.989*** -0.546*** 9.032*** -0.265*** 0.966*** 0.618*** 6.36% 
 (0.290) (0.303) (0.483) (0.067) (1.966) (0.040) (0.238) (0.056)  
 STR  -5.109*** -0.476 1.818* 0.026 18.372*** 0.341*** 0.967* 1.246*** 11.64% 
  (0.749) (0.705) (1.065) (0.194) (4.253) (0.084) (0.520) (0.119)  
 LTR  -1.017*** -0.360* -1.175*** -0.748*** 17.915*** -0.408*** 0.039 0.551*** 18.79% 
  (0.215) (0.203) (0.303) (0.042) (1.221) (0.024) (0.149) (0.034)  
Disagreement CPI  -0.104** -0.156*** -0.128* -0.169*** 7.371*** -0.069*** 0.025 0.057*** 17.63% 
 (0.045) (0.047) (0.075) (0.010) (0.307) (0.006) (0.037) (0.009)  
 STR  -0.288*** -0.133*** -0.176*** -0.061*** 4.614*** -0.057*** 0.003 0.080*** 24.35% 
  (0.036) (0.034) (0.051) (0.009) (0.204) (0.004) (0.025) (0.006)  
 LTR  -0.115*** -0.068** -0.086* -0.063*** 2.661*** -0.025*** 0.015 0.051*** 8.83% 
  (0.034) (0.032) (0.048) (0.007) (0.192) (0.004) (0.023) (0.005)  
 
Note:  This table reports estimation results of equation (9):                
    
             
  
                            .      is the uncertainty component: 
aggregate uncertainty, common uncertainty, and disagreement.  Dummy       takes the value 1 for country i where the country operates an inflation targeting at month t and zero 
otherwise. Dummy      takes the value 1 for country i where the central bank has been identified as operating forward guidance and zero otherwise.      is a set of control 
variables: the lagged 1-month change in WTI crude oil price (OIL), the term spread (SPREAD), the lagged 1-month change in exchange rates (FOREX), the output gap (GAP), 
the unemployment rate (UNE) and the level of underlying variables (LEVEL). Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ***, ** and * signify statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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  Table 4: The influence of monetary policy transparency on uncertainty components 
Component Variable                                                    
  Turning Point 
 
Max/ Min 
 
Panel A: Short horizon 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -0.834*** 0.035*** -0.066 0.037* 5.234*** 0.001 0.115* 0.222*** 15.83% 11.86 Min 
 (0.072) (0.004) (0.140) (0.021) (0.538) (0.012) (0.063) (0.016)    
 STR  -4.654*** 0.232*** 0.477 0.022 23.170*** -0.253*** 1.189*** 0.926*** 28.96% 10.01 Min 
  (0.258) (0.013) (0.480) (0.101) (1.794) (0.038) (0.214) (0.077)    
 LTR  -2.956*** 0.137*** 0.180 -0.102*** 4.884*** -0.095*** 0.714*** 0.191*** 22.58% 10.79 Min 
  (0.131) (0.007) (0.241) (0.036) (0.914) (0.019) (0.110) (0.039)    
Common uncertainty CPI  -0.534*** 0.022*** 0.011 0.126*** 1.607*** 0.019* 0.105* 0.176*** 9.34% 12.23 Min 
 (0.065) (0.003) (0.126) (0.019) (0.484) (0.010) (0.057) (0.014)    
 STR  -4.041*** 0.203*** 0.536 0.048 20.805*** -0.225*** 1.224*** 0.860*** 26.59% 9.95 Min 
  (0.245) (0.013) (0.456) (0.096) (1.704) (0.036) (0.204) (0.073)    
 LTR  -2.891*** 0.133*** 0.110 -0.096*** 4.158*** -0.086*** 0.681*** 0.155*** 21.82% 10.87 Min 
  (0.128) (0.007) (0.235) (0.035) (0.892) (0.019) (0.107) (0.038)    
Disagreement CPI  -0.301*** 0.013*** -0.076* -0.089*** 3.627*** -0.018*** 0.010 0.047*** 28.03% 11.26 Min 
 (0.022) (0.001) (0.043) (0.006) (0.167) (0.004) (0.020) (0.005)    
 STR  -0.613*** 0.029*** -0.059 -0.025*** 2.366*** -0.027*** -0.034* 0.066*** 36.66% 10.42 Min 
  (0.023) (0.001) (0.044) (0.009) (0.163) (0.003) (0.019) (0.007)    
 LTR  -0.065*** 0.004*** 0.070*** -0.005 0.727*** -0.009*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 8.98% 8.35 Min 
  (0.012) (0.001) (0.023) (0.003) (0.086) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004)    
Panel B: Long horizon 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -3.401*** 0.150*** 2.234*** -1.188*** 19.652*** -0.341*** 1.223*** 1.096*** 16.45% 11.32 Min 
 (0.343) (0.018) (0.661) (0.099) (2.545) (0.054) (0.299) (0.076)    
 STR  -8.324*** 0.412*** -0.993 0.019 39.708*** 0.061 0.877** 1.408*** 25.93% 10.09 Min 
  (0.454) (0.023) (0.845) (0.178) (3.156) (0.067) (0.377) (0.135)    
 LTR  -3.460*** 0.165*** -1.892*** -0.560*** 19.351*** -0.213*** 0.151 0.671*** 25.28% 10.48 Min 
  (0.201) (0.010) (0.369) (0.055) (1.399) (0.029) (0.168) (0.059)    
Common uncertainty CPI  -2.679*** 0.118*** 2.612*** -0.949*** 11.463*** -0.289*** 1.167*** 0.982*** 12.33% 11.32 Min 
 (0.328) (0.018) (0.632) (0.094) (2.434) (0.052) (0.286) (0.072)    
 STR  -7.630*** 0.379*** -0.713 0.036 35.761*** 0.094 0.838** 1.303*** 23.46% 10.06 Min 
  (0.445) (0.023) (0.827) (0.174) (3.090) (0.065) (0.369) (0.132)    
 LTR  -3.178*** 0.151*** -1.681*** -0.482*** 16.398*** -0.194*** 0.117 0.593*** 23.69% 10.52 Min 
  (0.187) (0.010) (0.343) (0.052) (1.302) (0.027) (0.156) (0.055)    
Disagreement CPI  -0.723*** 0.032*** -0.379*** -0.239*** 8.189*** -0.052*** 0.056 0.114*** 28.93% 11.28 Min 
 (0.050) (0.003) (0.096) (0.014) (0.369) (0.008) (0.043) (0.011)    
 STR  -0.694*** 0.033*** -0.280*** -0.017 3.947*** -0.033*** 0.039 0.105*** 34.88% 10.47 Min 
  (0.032) (0.002) (0.059) (0.012) (0.220) (0.005) (0.026) (0.009)    
 LTR  -0.283*** 0.014*** -0.211*** -0.078*** 2.953*** -0.019*** 0.033 0.078*** 12.00% 10.08 Min 
  (0.035) (0.002) (0.064) (0.010) (0.243) (0.005) (0.029) (0.010)    
Note:  This table reports estimation results of equation (10):                
    
             
  
                    
          .      is the uncertainty 
component: aggregate uncertainty, common uncertainty, and disagreement.      is a transparency index of Dincer and Eichengreen (2014).     is a set of control variables: 
the lagged 1-month change in WTI crude oil price (OIL), the term spread (SPREAD), the lagged 1-month change in exchange rates (FOREX), the output gap (GAP), the 
unemployment rate (UNE) and the level of underlying variables (LEVEL). Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Min/Max indicates whether the turning 
point is minimum (Min) or maximum (Max) point. ***, ** and * signify statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively.  
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Table 5: The influence of monetary policy transparency on uncertainty components for inflation and non-inflation targeting 
Component Variable                                                    
  Turning Point 
 
Max/ Min 
 
Panel A1: Short horizon – Non-inflation targeting economies 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -0.929*** 0.046*** 0.239 -0.010 11.368*** 0.005 -0.211 0.276*** 16.81% 10.11 Min 
 (0.207) (0.013) (0.315) (0.050) (1.371) (0.029) (0.255) (0.036)    
 STR  -4.329*** 0.242*** 2.816*** -1.046*** 24.848*** 0.100 0.888 0.280 19.31% 8.95 Min 
  (0.612) (0.038) (0.958) (0.276) (3.972) (0.071) (0.738) (0.192)    
 LTR  -2.388*** 0.116*** 1.618*** -0.446*** 9.204*** 0.063* -0.788** -0.369*** 10.57% 10.30 Min 
  (0.303) (0.019) (0.459) (0.075) (1.992) (0.035) (0.371) (0.094)    
Common uncertainty CPI  -0.752*** 0.038*** 0.268 0.186*** 3.875*** 0.004 -0.350 0.249*** 9.97% 10.00 Min 
 (0.191) (0.012) (0.292) (0.046) (1.269) (0.027) (0.236) (0.033)    
 STR  -3.959*** 0.222*** 2.755*** -0.907*** 21.997*** 0.094 1.157* 0.262 18.14% 8.93 Min 
  (0.573) (0.035) (0.897) (0.259) (3.720) (0.067) (0.691) (0.180)    
 LTR  -2.216*** 0.107*** 1.516*** -0.444*** 8.305*** 0.061* -0.753** -0.379*** 9.58% 10.35 Min 
  (0.298) (0.018) (0.453) (0.074) (1.962) (0.035) (0.366) (0.093)    
Disagreement CPI  -0.177*** 0.008** -0.030 -0.196*** 7.493*** 0.001 0.139** 0.027*** 41.57% 10.57 Min 
 (0.056) (0.003) (0.086) (0.014) (0.373) (0.008) (0.069) (0.010)    
 STR  -0.370*** 0.020*** 0.061 -0.139*** 2.851*** 0.006 -0.269*** 0.018 21.68% 9.21 Min 
  (0.058) (0.004) (0.092) (0.026) (0.380) (0.007) (0.070) (0.018)    
 LTR  -0.173*** 0.009*** 0.102*** -0.002 0.900*** 0.003 -0.034 0.010* 14.74% 9.70 Min 
  (0.019) (0.001) (0.028) (0.005) (0.123) (0.002) (0.023) (0.006)    
Panel A2: Short horizon –Inflation targeting economies 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  0.223*** -0.012*** 0.278*** 0.038*** 0.710** -0.020*** 0.052* 0.116*** 11.81% 9.16 Max 
 (0.073) (0.003) (0.077) (0.012) (0.285) (0.006) (0.029) (0.010)    
 STR  0.538 -0.008 0.644 0.486*** 14.543*** -0.310*** 1.616*** 1.153*** 17.30% 34.01 Max 
  (0.458) (0.021) (0.476) (0.091) (1.735) (0.041) (0.178) (0.070)    
 LTR  -1.241*** 0.056*** 0.252 -0.163*** 0.799 -0.164*** 0.396*** 0.198*** 7.54% 11.01 Min 
  (0.202) (0.009) (0.209) (0.033) (0.762) (0.018) (0.078) (0.031)    
Common uncertainty CPI  0.180*** -0.010*** 0.097 0.033*** 0.461** -0.007 0.054** 0.069*** 7.02% 8.80 Max 
 (0.059) (0.003) (0.062) (0.010) (0.229) (0.005) (0.023) (0.008)    
 STR  0.555 -0.009 0.501 0.471*** 13.726*** -0.285*** 1.597*** 1.091*** 16.07% 29.21 Max 
  (0.454) (0.021) (0.471) (0.090) (1.717) (0.041) (0.176) (0.069)    
 LTR  -1.319*** 0.059*** 0.181 -0.146*** 0.195 -0.143*** 0.347*** 0.144*** 6.88% 11.25 Min 
  (0.189) (0.009) (0.196) (0.031) (0.714) (0.017) (0.073) (0.029)    
Disagreement CPI  0.043 -0.002 0.181*** 0.005 0.248** -0.013*** -0.002 0.047*** 15.39% 11.01 Max 
 (0.027) (0.001) (0.028) (0.004) (0.105) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004)    
 STR  -0.017 0.002 0.143*** 0.015*** 0.817*** -0.026*** 0.019* 0.062*** 13.92% 5.23 Min 
  (0.029) (0.001) (0.030) (0.006) (0.111) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004)    
 LTR  0.078*** -0.002 0.072** -0.018*** 0.604*** -0.021*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 7.64% 17.28 Max 
  (0.033) (0.002) (0.034) (0.005) (0.124) (0.003) (0.013) (0.005)    
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Table 5: The influence of monetary policy transparency on uncertainty components for inflation and non-inflation targeting (continued) 
Component Variable                                                    
  Turning Point 
 
Max/ Min 
 
Panel B1: Long horizon – Non-inflation targeting economies 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -0.982 0.026 7.135*** -2.842*** 29.457*** -0.442*** 2.582** 1.324*** 17.46% 18.87 Min 
 (0.980) (0.060) (1.493) (0.236) (6.502) (0.137) (1.209) (0.169)    
 STR  -3.845*** 0.234*** 6.346*** -1.852*** 70.718*** 0.441*** -5.583*** 0.857** 24.47% 8.22 Min 
  (1.116) (0.068) (1.747) (0.504) (7.243) (0.130) (1.345) (0.350)    
 LTR  -1.668*** 0.089*** 0.345 -1.235*** 35.250*** 0.116** -0.955* 0.544*** 30.32% 9.35 Min 
  (0.425) (0.026) (0.646) (0.105) (2.799) (0.050) (0.522) (0.132)    
Common uncertainty CPI  -0.630 0.010 7.500*** -2.286*** 12.570** -0.383*** 2.153* 1.179*** 11.98% 30.71 Min 
 (0.952) (0.059) (1.450) (0.230) (6.313) (0.133) (1.174) (0.164)    
 STR  -3.471*** 0.214*** 6.579*** -1.653*** 64.709*** 0.432*** -5.437*** 0.819** 22.26% 8.10 Min 
  (1.096) (0.067) (1.716) (0.495) (7.115) (0.128) (1.321) (0.344)    
 LTR  -1.458*** 0.079*** 0.608 -1.017*** 30.137*** 0.107** -0.893* 0.547*** 28.60% 9.21 Min 
  (0.383) (0.023) (0.581) (0.095) (2.519) (0.045) (0.470) (0.119)    
Disagreement CPI  -0.352*** 0.016** -0.364* -0.556*** 16.887*** -0.059*** 0.429*** 0.145*** 42.76% 11.16 Min 
 (0.130) (0.008) (0.198) (0.031) (0.864) (0.018) (0.161) (0.022)    
 STR  -0.374*** 0.020*** -0.233* -0.198*** 6.009*** 0.009 -0.146 0.038 27.70% 9.46 Min 
  (0.080) (0.005) (0.126) (0.036) (0.521) (0.009) (0.097) (0.025)    
 LTR  -0.210*** 0.010* -0.263* -0.218*** 5.113*** 0.009 -0.062 -0.002 14.07% 10.48 Min 
  (0.096) (0.006) (0.146) (0.024) (0.632) (0.011) (0.118) (0.030)    
Panel B2: Long horizon –Inflation targeting economies 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -0.244 0.004 -0.023 -0.012 5.616*** -0.009 0.848*** 0.820*** 14.99% 27.30 Min 
 (0.338) (0.016) (0.357) (0.056) (1.317) (0.030) (0.134) (0.045)    
 STR  -2.053*** 0.107*** -0.002 -0.276** 9.129*** 0.061 0.149 0.646*** 10.30% 9.56 Min 
  (0.592) (0.027) (0.614) (0.118) (2.240) (0.054) (0.229) (0.090)    
 LTR  -3.082*** 0.143*** -0.751* -0.255*** 1.257 -0.349*** 0.145 0.371*** 8.39% 10.74 Min 
  (0.383) (0.018) (0.397) (0.063) (1.446) (0.035) (0.148) (0.058)    
Common uncertainty CPI  -0.257 0.005 -0.289 -0.023 5.314*** 0.006 0.827*** 0.772*** 14.33% 25.78 Min 
 (0.329) (0.015) (0.348) (0.055) (1.281) (0.029) (0.130) (0.044)    
 STR  -2.026*** 0.105*** -0.137 -0.297** 8.209*** 0.094* 0.099 0.572*** 9.67% 9.61 Min 
  (0.594) (0.027) (0.617) (0.118) (2.249) (0.054) (0.230) (0.090)    
 LTR  -3.115*** 0.144*** -0.885** -0.250*** 0.901 -0.331*** 0.142 0.326*** 7.96% 10.81 Min 
  (0.377) (0.017) (0.391) (0.062) (1.426) (0.034) (0.146) (0.057)    
Disagreement CPI  0.013 -0.001 0.267*** 0.011** 0.301*** -0.015*** 0.021** 0.048*** 15.10% 12.44 Max 
 (0.027) (0.001) (0.028) (0.004) (0.104) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004)    
 STR  -0.027 0.002 0.135*** 0.021*** 0.920*** -0.033*** 0.050*** 0.073*** 11.75% 6.80 Min 
  (0.038) (0.002) (0.040) (0.008) (0.145) (0.003) (0.015) (0.006)    
 LTR  0.033 -0.001 0.134*** -0.005 0.356*** -0.018*** 0.003 0.045*** 6.15% 28.50 Max 
  (0.032) (0.001) (0.033) (0.005) (0.122) (0.003) (0.012) (0.005)    
Note:  This table reports estimation results of equation (10):                
    
             
  
                    
          .      is the uncertainty 
component: aggregate uncertainty, common uncertainty, and disagreement.      is a transparency index of Dincer and Eichengreen (2014).    is a set of control variables: 
the lagged 1-month change in WTI crude oil price (OIL), the term spread (SPREAD), the lagged 1-month change in exchange rates (FOREX), the output gap (GAP), the 
unemployment rate (UNE) and the level of underlying variables (LEVEL). Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Min/Max indicates whether the turning 
point is minimum (Min) or maximum (Max) point. ***, ** and * signify statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively.  
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Table 6: Alternative estimates of dummy variable effects  
Component Measure CPI-SH CPI-LH STR-SH STR-LH LTR-SH LTR-LH 
Panel A: Coefficient on inflation targeting dummy (   ) 
Common uncertainty ex ante -0.532*** 
(0.058) 
-1.231*** 
(0.290) 
-0.743*** 
(0.286) 
-5.109*** 
(0.749) 
-0.988*** 
(0.133) 
-1.017*** 
(0.215) 
 ex post -0.499*** 
(0.070) 
-1.034*** 
(0.256) 
-0.409*** 
(0.148) 
-3.185*** 
(0.611) 
-1.075*** 
(0.139) 
-0.873*** 
(0.212) 
 PSM -0.418*** 
(0.066) 
-1.192*** 
(0.281) 
-0.685*** 
(0.219) 
-4.826*** 
(0.567) 
-0.814*** 
(0.114) 
-1.006*** 
(0.201) 
Disagreement ex ante -0.035* 
(0.020) 
-0.104** 
(0.045) 
-0.155*** 
(0.026) 
-0.288*** 
(0.036) 
-0.030** 
(0.012) 
-0.115*** 
(0.034) 
 PSM -0.029** 
(0.013) 
-0.090** 
(0.035) 
-0.131*** 
(0.019) 
-0.247*** 
(0.028) 
-0.025*** 
(0.009) 
-0.103*** 
(0.030) 
Panel B: Coefficient on forward guidance dummy (   ) 
Common uncertainty ex ante 0.016 
(0.061) 
0.378 
(0.303) 
-0.672** 
(0.269) 
-0.476 
(0.705) 
-0.247** 
(0.126) 
-0.360* 
(0.203) 
 ex post 0.006 
(0.073) 
0.386 
(0.267) 
-0.466** 
(0.213) 
-0.593 
(0.575) 
-0.375* 
(0.215) 
-0.408 
(0.252) 
 PSM 0.012 
(0.053) 
0.317 
(0.281) 
-0.538*** 
(0.198) 
-0.402 
(0.483) 
-0.216** 
(0.105) 
-0.327* 
(0.188) 
Disagreement ex ante -0.056*** 
(0.021) 
-0.156*** 
(0.047) 
-0.089*** 
(0.024) 
-0.133*** 
(0.034) 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
-0.068** 
(0.032) 
 PSM -0.051*** 
(0.018) 
-0.128*** 
(0.039) 
-0.074*** 
(0.016) 
-0.117*** 
(0.027) 
-0.025*** 
(0.009) 
-0.053*** 
(0.020) 
Note:  This table compares coefficients on inflation targeting (   ) and forward guidance dummy variables (   ) 
estimated from equation (9) for short horizon (SH) and long horizon (LH) forecasts for inflation (CPI), short-term rates 
(STR) and long-term rates (LTR). Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ***, ** and * signify 
statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. To address any biases resulting from the likelihood that the 
sample of economies with central banks that have adopted IT are likely to differ substantially from those that have not, 
we use propensity score matching (PSM) (see also Crowe 2010). The variables used for PSM include the cross-
sectional dispersion of professional forecasts of inflation, short-term interest rates and long-term interest rates and the 
consensus mean forecast of these variables. The ex ante results correspond to those reported in Table 3. The ex post 
results are based on ex post measure of uncertainty obtained from the deviation of forecasts from outcome (Barron et al. 
1998) 
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Table 7: Comparison of ex ante and ex post results for common uncertainty 
 
Estimates Measure CPI-SH CPI-LH STR-SH STR-LH LTR-SH LTR-LH 
     ex ante -0.534*** 
(0.065) 
-2.679*** 
(0.328) 
-4.041*** 
(0.245) 
-7.630*** 
(0.445) 
-2.891*** 
(0.128) 
-3.178*** 
(0.187) 
ex post -0.704*** 
(0.080) 
-3.932*** 
(0.282) 
-2.609*** 
(0.207) 
-6.593*** 
(0.399) 
-2.849*** 
(0.128) 
-3.152*** 
(0.188) 
      ex ante 0.022*** 
(0.003) 
0.118*** 
(0.018) 
0.203*** 
(0.013) 
0.379*** 
(0.023) 
0.133*** 
(0.007) 
0.151*** 
(0.010) 
ex post 0.029*** 
(0.004) 
0.181*** 
(0.015) 
0.135*** 
(0.011) 
0.334*** 
(0.021) 
0.131*** 
(0.007) 
0.160*** 
(0.010) 
Turning point ex ante 12.23 11.32 9.95 10.06 10.87 10.52 
ex post 12.05 10.89 9.69 9.87 10.87 9.88 
Impact at turning point ex ante -3.24 -15.21 -20.11 -38.40 -15.71 -16.72 
ex post -4.27 -21.35 -12.61 -32.54 -15.49 -15.52 
Note: This table compares coefficients on the transparency index (   ), its squared term (    ), and turning 
point estimated from equation (10) for short horizon (SH) and long horizon (LH) forecasts for inflation (CPI), 
short-term rates (STR) and long-term rates (LTR). Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ***, 
** and * signify statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. Impact at turning point is the 
reduction in uncertainty brought about by moving from zero transparency to the turning point. The ex ante 
results correspond to those reported in Table 3. The ex post results are based on ex post measure of uncertainty 
obtained from the deviation of forecasts from outcome (Barron et al. 1998). 
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Table 8: The influence of inflation targeting on uncertainty components for emerging and developed economies  
 
Component Variable                                               
  
Panel A1: Short horizon – Emerging economies 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -1.365*** 0.932** 0.232*** 14.793*** -0.089*** 0.017 0.475*** 34.14% 
 (0.264) (0.455) (0.046) (1.437) (0.028) (0.165) (0.039)  
 STR  -2.752* 9.782*** -1.516*** 40.614*** -1.543*** 1.725** 2.222*** 54.62% 
  (1.668) (2.366) (0.371) (6.983) (0.138) (0.791) (0.281)  
 LTR  -7.527*** 4.758*** -0.438*** 16.553*** -0.525*** 1.060*** 0.175 35.29% 
  (0.781) (1.017) (0.102) (3.265) (0.064) (0.369) (0.130)  
Common uncertainty CPI  -1.326*** 0.574 0.316*** 5.843*** -0.037 0.045 0.395*** 25.40% 
 (0.232) (0.400) (0.040) (1.262) (0.025) (0.145) (0.034)  
 STR  -2.180* 9.076*** -1.422*** 34.883*** -1.407*** 1.977*** 2.103*** 52.64% 
  (1.205) (2.276) (0.357) (6.718) (0.133) (0.761) (0.270)  
 LTR  -7.216*** 4.306*** -0.405*** 15.267*** -0.499*** 0.972*** 0.095 34.84% 
  (0.760) (0.991) (0.100) (3.181) (0.062) (0.360) (0.127)  
Disagreement CPI  -0.039 0.358** -0.083*** 8.950*** -0.052*** -0.028 0.080*** 42.56% 
 (0.099) (0.170) (0.017) (0.536) (0.010) (0.062) (0.015)  
 STR  -0.572*** 0.706*** -0.093*** 5.731*** -0.136*** -0.252*** 0.119*** 48.58% 
  (0.151) (0.214) (0.034) (0.632) (0.013) (0.072) (0.025)  
 LTR  -0.311*** 0.452*** -0.033*** 1.287*** -0.026*** 0.088** 0.080*** 15.85% 
  (0.074) (0.096) (0.010) (0.308) (0.006) (0.035) (0.012)  
Panel A2: Short horizon – Developed economies 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -0.429*** 0.160* -0.014 2.050*** -0.013* 0.048 0.057*** 6.73% 
 (0.052) (0.087) (0.013) (0.386) (0.008) (0.047) (0.011)  
 STR  -0.351*** 0.716*** 0.082** 10.196*** -0.052*** 0.262*** 0.265*** 12.24% 
  (0.116) (0.166) (0.032) (0.733) (0.014) (0.090) (0.018)  
 LTR  -0.112*** 0.108** 0.054*** 0.680*** -0.005 -0.017 0.090*** 7.51% 
  (0.037) (0.054) (0.008) (0.237) (0.005) (0.029) (0.006)  
Common uncertainty CPI  -0.410*** 0.030 -0.016 1.797*** -0.007 0.028 0.049*** 5.65% 
 (0.050) (0.083) (0.013) (0.367) (0.007) (0.045) (0.010)  
 STR  -0.340*** 0.680*** 0.075** 9.686*** -0.048*** 0.244*** 0.246*** 11.61% 
  (0.112) (0.160) (0.031) (0.707) (0.014) (0.087) (0.018)  
 LTR  -0.090** 0.070 0.047*** 0.438* 0.000*** -0.031 0.078*** 5.86% 
  (0.036) (0.052) (0.008) (0.231) (0.004) (0.028) (0.006)  
Disagreement CPI  -0.019** 0.130*** 0.002 0.253*** -0.006*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 16.22% 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.002) (0.057) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002)  
 STR  -0.012 0.036*** 0.007*** 0.510*** -0.004*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 13.34% 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.045) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)  
 LTR  -0.022*** 0.038*** 0.007*** 0.242*** -0.005*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 9.60% 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.036) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)  
 
  
  
37 
 
Table 8: The influence of inflation targeting on uncertainty components for emerging and developed economies (continued) 
 
Component Variable                                               
  
Panel B1: Long horizon – Emerging economies 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -1.506 12.436*** -0.417** 57.401*** -0.608*** 1.238* 1.937*** 34.48% 
 (1.139) (1.961) (0.198) (6.195) (0.121) (0.713) (0.169)  
 STR  -44.931*** 26.580*** -0.365 -6.908 1.917*** -3.566 1.535* 34.34% 
  (4.650) (6.594) (1.034) (19.461) (0.385) (2.205) (0.782)  
 LTR  -1.474 4.333*** -1.640*** 52.649*** -0.840*** 0.333 0.982*** 44.03% 
  (1.154) (1.503) (0.151) (4.826) (0.095) (0.545) (0.192)  
Common uncertainty CPI  -1.381 12.365*** -0.116 36.407*** -0.473*** 1.206* 1.831*** 28.68% 
 (1.061) (1.826) (0.185) (5.767) (0.113) (0.664) (0.157)  
 STR  -44.036*** 26.526*** -0.205 -17.516 2.067*** -3.441 1.406* 32.52% 
  (4.648) (6.592) (1.034) (19.452) (0.385) (2.204) (0.782)  
 LTR  -1.228 4.184*** -1.508*** 46.306*** -0.796*** 0.312 0.897*** 42.14% 
  (1.078) (1.404) (0.141) (4.509) (0.088) (0.510) (0.179)  
Disagreement CPI  -0.125 0.071 -0.301*** 20.995*** -0.135*** 0.032 0.106*** 44.46% 
 (0.222) (0.383) (0.039) (1.209) (0.024) (0.139) (0.033)  
 STR  -0.895*** 0.054 -0.160*** 10.608*** -0.150*** -0.125 0.130*** 52.29% 
  (0.205) (0.291) (0.046) (0.860) (0.017) (0.097) (0.035)  
 LTR  -0.246 0.149 -0.133*** 6.343*** -0.045** 0.021 0.085** 19.47% 
  (0.215) (0.280) (0.028) (0.899) (0.018) (0.102) (0.036)  
Panel B2: Long horizon – Developed economies 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -0.527** 1.875*** -0.493*** -1.854 -0.170*** 0.801*** 0.122** 1.83% 
 (0.269) (0.446) (0.069) (1.981) (0.040) (0.242) (0.056)  
 STR  -1.252*** -0.260 0.131* 5.940*** -0.072** 0.544*** 0.875*** 16.73% 
  (0.266) (0.380) (0.073) (1.679) (0.032) (0.207) (0.042)  
 LTR  -0.070 -0.916*** -0.098*** -1.124 -0.224*** -0.202* 0.397*** 14.15% 
  (0.136) (0.195) (0.030) (0.861) (0.017) (0.106) (0.022)  
Common uncertainty CPI  -0.496* 1.662*** -0.496*** -2.233 -0.148*** 0.753*** 0.109** 1.78% 
 (0.263) (0.437) (0.068) (1.940) (0.039) (0.237) (0.055)  
 STR  -1.243*** -0.276 0.088 5.435*** -0.061* 0.526** 0.829*** 15.71% 
  (0.264) (0.378) (0.073) (1.673) (0.032) (0.206) (0.042)  
 LTR  -0.044 -0.939*** -0.106*** -1.324 -0.213*** -0.198* 0.368*** 12.82% 
  (0.136) (0.194) (0.030) (0.858) (0.017) (0.106) (0.022)  
Disagreement CPI  -0.032** 0.213*** 0.003 0.379*** -0.022*** 0.049*** 0.013*** 6.04% 
 (0.015) (0.025) (0.004) (0.113) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003)  
 STR  -0.009 0.016 0.043*** 0.504*** -0.011*** 0.017** 0.045*** 23.19% 
  (0.011) (0.016) (0.003) (0.069) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002)  
 LTR  -0.025*** 0.023* 0.007*** 0.201*** -0.011*** -0.004 0.029*** 16.42% 
  (0.008) (0.012) (0.002) (0.052) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)  
Note:  This table reports estimation results of equation (9):                
    
             
  
                            .      is the uncertainty 
component: aggregate uncertainty, common uncertainty, and disagreement.  Dummy       takes the value 1 for country i where the country operates an inflation targeting 
at month t and zero otherwise. To compare between emerging and developed economies, Dummy      is excluded from equation (9) as none of emerging economies 
adopts forward guidance during our sample periods. Following IMF definition, developed economies include Australia, Canada, Eurozone, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom and United States. The 
remaining economies are emerging economies.    is a set of control variables: the lagged 1-month change in WTI crude oil price (OIL), the term spread (SPREAD), the 
lagged 1-month change in exchange rates (FOREX), the output gap (GAP), the unemployment rate (UNE) and the level of underlying variables (LEVEL). Robust 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ***, ** and * signify statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Table 9: The influence of monetary policy transparency on uncertainty components for emerging and developed economies 
Component Variable                                                    
  Turning Point 
 
Max/ Min 
 
Panel A1: Short horizon – Emerging economies 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -1.208*** 0.051** 0.647 0.258*** 10.303*** 0.138*** 0.236 0.438*** 36.72% 11.81 Min 
 (0.308) (0.025) (0.485) (0.068) (1.860) (0.047) (0.181) (0.042)    
 STR  -6.031*** 0.407*** 10.054*** -0.230 6.513 -0.551*** 1.942** 2.704*** 45.87% 7.40 Min 
  (1.396) (0.111) (2.335) (0.418) (8.567) (0.210) (0.812) (0.320)    
 LTR  -2.450*** 0.029 4.102*** -0.549*** 4.610 -0.191* 2.120*** 0.146 37.22% 42.29 Min 
  (0.687) (0.056) (1.078) (0.150) (4.288) (0.100) (0.410) (0.160)    
Common uncertainty CPI  -0.993*** 0.048** 0.329 0.504*** 2.422 0.111*** 0.274* 0.405*** 27.53% 10.30 Min 
 (0.273) (0.022) (0.429) (0.060) (1.646) (0.041) (0.160) (0.037)    
 STR  -5.184*** 0.361*** 9.261*** -0.107 4.149 -0.498** 2.138*** 2.554*** 42.54% 7.18 Min 
  (1.341) (0.106) (2.242) (0.402) (8.227) (0.202) (0.779) (0.307)    
 LTR  -2.406*** 0.023 3.612*** -0.509*** 3.554 -0.177* 2.067*** 0.064 36.45% 51.40 Min 
  (0.671) (0.054) (1.054) (0.146) (4.193) (0.098) (0.401) (0.156)    
Disagreement CPI  -0.214*** 0.003 0.317** -0.247*** 7.881*** 0.027* -0.038 0.033** 56.34% 36.46 Min 
 (0.102) (0.008) (0.161) (0.022) (0.617) (0.015) (0.060) (0.014)    
 STR  -0.847** 0.047*** 0.793*** -0.123*** 2.364*** -0.053*** -0.196*** 0.151*** 55.10% 9.10 Min 
  (0.125) (0.010) (0.210) (0.038) (0.770) (0.019) (0.073) (0.029)    
 LTR  -0.044*** 0.006 0.490*** -0.040*** 1.057** -0.015 0.053 0.082*** 13.98% 3.95 Min 
  (0.067) (0.005) (0.105) (0.015) (0.416) (0.010) (0.040) (0.015)    
Panel A2: Short horizon – Developed economies 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -0.123 0.004 0.056 0.036** 1.831*** 0.004 -0.007 0.010 4.82% 15.29 Min 
 (0.077) (0.004) (0.114) (0.018) (0.461) (0.010) (0.055) (0.015)    
 STR  -2.060*** 0.096*** 1.439*** 0.014 8.756*** 0.010 0.305*** 0.109*** 18.61% 10.73 Min 
  (0.132) (0.006) (0.195) (0.043) (0.786) (0.015) (0.094) (0.033)    
 LTR  -0.261*** 0.012*** 0.082 0.060*** 0.949*** -0.001 0.001 0.046*** 6.15% 10.74 Min 
  (0.037) (0.002) (0.054) (0.008) (0.218) (0.004) (0.026) (0.009)    
Common uncertainty CPI  -0.070 0.001 -0.092 0.030* 1.565*** 0.010 -0.024 0.017 3.30% 26.56 Min 
 (0.072) (0.004) (0.107) (0.017) (0.436) (0.009) (0.052) (0.014)    
 STR  -1.911*** 0.089*** 1.389*** 0.008 8.252*** 0.013 0.282*** 0.090*** 17.78% 10.73 Min 
  (0.127) (0.006) (0.187) (0.041) (0.755) (0.014) (0.090) (0.031)    
 LTR  -0.208*** 0.009*** 0.045 0.050*** 0.703*** 0.005 -0.012 0.032*** 3.85% 11.20 Min 
  (0.035) (0.002) (0.052) (0.008) (0.210) (0.004) (0.025) (0.009)    
Disagreement CPI  -0.054*** 0.003*** 0.147*** 0.007** 0.266*** -0.006*** 0.017* -0.007*** 16.87% 9.87 Min 
 (0.012) (0.001) (0.018) (0.003) (0.072) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002)    
 STR  -0.149*** 0.007*** 0.050*** 0.006** 0.505*** -0.003*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 21.16% 10.69 Min 
  (0.008) (0.000) (0.012) (0.003) (0.050) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002)    
 LTR  -0.053*** 0.003*** 0.038*** 0.010*** 0.246*** -0.006*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 14.55% 9.26 Min 
  (0.007) (0.000) (0.010) (0.001) (0.039) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)    
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Table 9: The influence of monetary policy transparency on uncertainty components for emerging and developed economies (continued) 
Component Variable                                                    
  Turning Point 
 
Max/ Min 
 
Panel B1: Long horizon – Emerging economies 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -3.563 0.078 12.042 -1.567 34.458 0.414 1.482 1.597 44.46% 22.69 Min 
 (1.246) (0.099) (1.961) (0.274) (7.523) (0.188) (0.733) (0.169)    
 STR  -13.698 0.650 12.401 -0.419 59.088 1.055 1.705 1.540 38.34% 10.54 Min 
  (2.507) (0.199) (4.192) (0.751) (15.383) (0.377) (1.457) (0.575)    
 LTR  0.016 -0.186 2.946 -1.920 33.602 -0.136 0.290 0.873 46.07% 0.04 Max 
  (0.942) (0.076) (1.479) (0.205) (5.884) (0.137) (0.562) (0.219)    
Common uncertainty CPI  -3.115 0.079 12.132 -0.903 16.176 0.353 1.447 1.600 36.22% 19.60 Min 
 (1.191) (0.095) (1.874) (0.262) (7.190) (0.180) (0.700) (0.162)    
 STR  -12.793 0.607 12.224 -0.261 54.564 1.073 1.717 1.327 34.46% 10.53 Min 
  (2.478) (0.197) (4.143) (0.742) (15.201) (0.373) (1.440) (0.568)    
 LTR  0.269 -0.195 2.729 -1.647 30.651 -0.168 0.312 0.681 43.49% 0.69 Max 
  (0.879) (0.071) (1.380) (0.192) (5.489) (0.128) (0.524) (0.204)    
Disagreement CPI  -0.448 -0.001 -0.090 -0.664 18.282 0.060 0.034 -0.003 57.93% n/a n/a 
 (0.228) (0.018) (0.358) (0.050) (1.373) (0.034) (0.134) (0.031)    
 STR  -0.905 0.043 0.178 -0.158 4.524 -0.018 -0.012 0.212 55.80% 10.59 Min 
  (0.167) (0.013) (0.278) (0.050) (1.022) (0.025) (0.097) (0.038)    
 LTR  -0.254 0.008 0.217 -0.273 2.951 0.032 -0.022 0.192 24.30% 15.13 Min 
  (0.187) (0.015) (0.294) (0.041) (1.171) (0.027) (0.112) (0.044)    
Panel B2: Long horizon – Developed economies 
Aggregate uncertainty CPI  -0.483 0.020 1.429** -0.812*** 2.726 -0.283*** 0.946*** 0.294*** 2.09% 11.79 Min 
 (0.423) (0.021) (0.627) (0.098) (2.546) (0.053) (0.304) (0.085)    
 STR  -1.042*** 0.070*** 0.255 -0.140 9.492*** 0.045 0.348* 0.852*** 18.01% 7.84 Min 
  (0.276) (0.013) (0.407) (0.089) (1.642) (0.031) (0.196) (0.068)    
 LTR  -1.058*** 0.052*** -0.564*** 0.022 -0.459 -0.094*** -0.247*** 0.221*** 5.71% 10.16 Min 
  (0.125) (0.006) (0.184) (0.028) (0.743) (0.014) (0.089) (0.031)    
Common uncertainty CPI  -0.297 0.011 1.106* -0.807*** 2.591 -0.255*** 0.891*** 0.255*** 1.95% 13.12 Min 
 (0.415) (0.021) (0.614) (0.096) (2.493) (0.052) (0.298) (0.083)    
 STR  -0.923*** 0.064*** 0.144 -0.158* 8.976*** 0.051 0.332* 0.830*** 17.81% 7.19 Min 
  (0.274) (0.013) (0.405) (0.088) (1.633) (0.031) (0.195) (0.068)    
 LTR  -0.982*** 0.049*** -0.616*** 0.012 -0.709 -0.086*** -0.253*** 0.218*** 5.12% 10.10 Min 
  (0.124) (0.006) (0.183) (0.028) (0.738) (0.014) (0.088) (0.031)    
Disagreement CPI  -0.186*** 0.009*** 0.323*** -0.005 0.135 -0.028*** 0.056*** 0.039*** 10.11% 10.15 Min 
 (0.022) (0.001) (0.033) (0.005) (0.134) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004)    
 STR  -0.119*** 0.005*** 0.111*** 0.019*** 0.516*** -0.006*** 0.016** 0.022*** 16.57% 10.85 Min 
  (0.010) (0.001) (0.015) (0.003) (0.062) (0.001) (0.007) (0.003)    
 LTR  -0.077*** 0.003*** 0.052*** 0.010*** 0.250*** -0.008*** 0.006 0.003 10.44% 11.04 Min 
  (0.009) (0.000) (0.013) (0.002) (0.054) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002)    
Note:  This table reports estimation results of equation (10):                
    
             
  
                    
          .      is the uncertainty 
component: aggregate uncertainty, common uncertainty, and disagreement. Following IMF definition, developed economies include Australia, Canada, Eurozone, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom and United States. 
The remaining economies are emerging economies.      is a transparency index of Dincer and Eichengreen (2014).     is a set of control variables: the lagged 1-month 
change in WTI crude oil price (OIL), the term spread (SPREAD), the lagged 1-month change in exchange rates (FOREX), the output gap (GAP), the unemployment rate 
(UNE) and the level of underlying variables (LEVEL). Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Min/Max indicates whether the turning point is minimum 
(Min) or maximum (Max) point. ***, ** and * signify statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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The Implications of Central Bank Transparency for Uncertainty and Disagreement 
 
Highlights 
 Explore the effects of increased transparency, inflation targeting and forward guidance on aggregate uncertainty, common uncertainty and 
disagreement. 
 Provide evidence that increased transparency reduces mainly common uncertainty. 
 Looking at disagreement only understates benefits of transparency. 
 
 
 
